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Revitalizing Traditional Chinese Concepts in 
the Modern Ecological Civilization Debate* 
Finn Arler 





The subject of this paper is the question of China’s contribution to the estab-
lishment of an association of ecological civilizations—as seen from the pers-
pective of a European—given the growing economic, political, and ecological 
influence that China has in the world today. The question is which values are 
likely to guide Chinese development. Can concepts like “sustainability”, “en-
vironmental carefulness”, and “common concerns of humankind” easily be 
integrated as topics on the Chinese agenda? Or are they likely to be expelled 
due to some basic values and ideas in traditional (or modern) Chinese 
worldviews? The paper discusses a number of modern interpretations that 
have argued that some basic concepts in the Chinese tradition are not only 
congenial with, but even provide fruitful additions to the modern debate 
about the establishment of cooperative ecological civilizations. In the final 
part the strong modern influence of both Marxist conceptions and consumer-
ist behaviour is considered. 
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Like so many other Europeans before me, I find Chinese culture and society 
both fascinating and somewhat confusing; it is quite different from my own in a 
number of respects and yet strikingly familiar in many others. This is no less the 
case, when dealing with the issues that were brought up at the World Cultural 
Forum in Hangzhou 2013: exchanges and cooperation between the different 
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parts of the world in order to establish a sustainable association of ecological ci-
vilizations.  
China has to play a very important part, if we shall succeed with this noble 
mission. Not only does one fifth of the world’s population live in China. All the 
rest of us are also truly impressed—but also somewhat worried—about the fast 
economic growth that has taken place during the latest decades, and which is 
likely to continue for some time. For a number of years GDP growth rates have 
been higher than 10 pct. and are still around 7 pct. The industrial production 
growth rates have been even higher (CIA, 2018; World Bank, 2018). This is a 
change that matters on a global scale. China has always been a very important 
cultural and political player on the global scene, but the new economic perfor-
mance has certainly taken both its economic and ecological impact to a new lev-
el. 
The trouble is, of course, that significant industrial and economic growth not 
only results in higher living standards in the wealthiest parts of China. It is also 
followed by a number of serious environmental and resource-related conse-
quences that can be expected to grow for many years (cf. e.g. Grumbine, 2007; 
Flavin & Gardner, 2006). To mention just one example, in 2017 China emitted 
more than 10 billion metric tons carbon dioxide. This is more than 7.2 metric 
tons per capita, and three times as much as the emissions at the turn of the cen-
tury (Global Carbon Project, 2017). In comparison, in my own country, Den-
mark, we emit 6.7 metric tons per capita, two third of what we did a couple of 
decades ago. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has rec-
ommended emission levels of no more than 1.3 metric tons on average per world 
citizens in order to avoid further climate changes, so both countries are faced 
with serious challenges here as well as in other environmental areas.  
The Chinese Government is aware of this problem, and has launched two de-
tailed national climate change programs (China’s Government, 2007, 2012), 
where they present their interpretations of what the global Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change’s famous statement about “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (FCCC, 1992) entails for China. The government has an-
nounced a proposal to build a national emission trading system in order to make 
the effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions more efficiently (Shu, 2013). This 
is a clear sign that the government takes the problem seriously. 
My task here is not to scrutinize government policy, though. Instead, my focus 
will be on values related to the establishment of an association of ecological civi-
lizations—with a particular focus on the Chinese contribution, as seen from the 
perspective of a European. The obvious reason for doing this is the growing 
economic, political, and ecological influence that China has in the world today. 
What can we expect from China? Which kinds of values are likely to be guiding 
Chinese development? Can concepts like “sustainability”, “environmental care-
fulness”, and “common concerns of humankind” easily become topics on the 
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ditional (or modern) Chinese worldviews? Can some of the basic concepts that 
are prevalent in the Chinese tradition even be seen as fruitful additions in mod-
ern debates about the establishment of cooperative ecological civilizations? 
This is a daring task, of course. Firstly, in a country as huge as China with 
such a long and complex history, it would be strange to find just one unchal-
lenged set of values. Cultures change substantially over time, in recent time even 
very quickly, and are far from homogeneous at any instant of time. Secondly, 
even though China, due to its size, has a more autonomous history than most 
other countries, the cultural interchange with the rest of world has been going 
on all the time. Influence from conflicting sets of Western ideas, particularly Li-
beralism, Marxism, Leninism and recently “Capitalist Consumerism” (Harris, 
2004), has been significant during the latest century.  
I have defined my task more narrowly, though, by confining myself to more 
limited groups of writers. These includes, first of all, a number of writers have 
tried to revitalize traditional Chinese concepts in the current ecological debate. It 
is doubtful whether it makes sense to talk about some authentic “Chineseness” 
that has been assailed from by foreign ideas, and which now ought to be revita-
lized as basis of a new époque, but at least such ideas have been put forward (cf. 
Miller, 2010; Tu, 2005). Secondly, Marxist ideology has dominated for so long 
that it may now be considered part of the Chinese legacy. This makes it worth 
considering separately. The Maoist version of Marxism even has a certain affini-
ty with the Confucian tradition, as we shall see later. At the end of the paper I 
will discuss shortly whether a revitalization of traditional ideas is likely to make a 
difference in the present situation where consumerist patterns have become still 
more dominant. 
2. Following the Way of Nature 
During the latest couple of decades traditional Chinese (primarily Confucian, 
Daoist, and Buddhist) conceptions have been reintroduced by a number of au-
thors with the explicit purpose of giving support to modern ecological, sustaina-
bility, zero- or degrowth positions with demands for limited intervention, small 
scale, organic methods, non-invasive technologies, animal-friendliness, etc. (cf. 
Tucker, 1991, 1993; Tu, 1989, 2001, 2005; Jenkins, 2002; Tianchen, 2003; Kem-
merer, 2009), sometimes with the explicit intention to distance themselves from 
the influence of Western Enlightenment with its dualistic worldview, calculative 
rationality, reductionist science, and Faustian drive (e.g. Tu, 2001; Miller, 2012). 
These authors have tried to show that modern demands about sustainability are 
quite consistent with traditional views, particularly when contrasted with eco-
nomic growth supporters’ view of nature as nothing but a useful external source 
in need of control.  
One should be cautious, when it comes to translating general ancient ideas 
into modern policy recommendation, and one ought to be somewhat alert about 
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some interpretative effort, turn out to be surprisingly similar to those occurring 
in modern, global discourses (Rolston, 1987; Pedersen, 1995; Miller, 2010). Still, 
scepticism aside, there are a number of ideas in traditional Chinese thoughts that 
seem worthwhile to re-examine in the present debate about the prospects of an 
ecological civilization.  
First of all, considerations about nature and the “natural way” have always 
been an integral part of traditional Chinese philosophy (Tu, 2001; Tianchen, 
2003; Miller, 2010). A core principle of Daoism is that nature has its own har-
monious and balanced way. Dao, or the “way of nature”, is the basic principle of 
the universe, which organizes and structures everything in a way that leads to 
some kind of balance. This fundamental “way of nature” is also considered as 
the best criterion for human behaviour.  
What human beings ought to do is wu-wei, literally “non-action”, suggesting 
that one should drift along with the stream of life, and never invest in actions 
conflicting with the way nature flows. Humans should respect the rhythms of 
nature and avoid interrupting natural processes that, when left on their own, will 
lead to harmonious states. Confucianism predicates a human order whose ra-
tionality is based on the natural moral order of the universe, which, as we shall 
see shortly, promotes harmonic balance (Jenkins, 2002). 
The Chinese synthesis of Confucianism and Daoism (with an important input 
from Buddhism) is typically presented as non-dualistic. This can only be partly 
true, though. If there is a “way of nature” that humans ought to follow, there 
have to be some “ways off nature” that lead them astray. Humans cannot be one 
with nature without reservations, if they can act contrary to it. Similarly, if hu-
mans ought to return to nature’s way, they must have gone somewhere else in 
the meantime. If what humans have done is not an extension of nature (and so it 
would be, if humans were part of nature), what is it then? The route taken may 
be wrong for a number of reasons, but it must be one of nature’s routes, if it can 
be taken at all. 
This paradox can probably only be dissolved, if one accepts a dualism within 
nature itself. On the one hand there is ideal nature, nature at its best, i.e., when it 
flows its “natural way”. On the other hand there is real nature as a whole, in-
cluding both nature at its best and nature at its worst. In this case humans can be 
part of nature as a whole at the same time as they try to further nature at its best. 
According to modern interpreters of traditional Chinese philosophies the ba-
sic goal of humanity is to ensure a positive correlation between humanity (ren), 
earth (di) and heaven or nature (tian) in order to generate an optimal state 
where all parties will flourish (Miller, 2012; Tu, 1989). This way the “way of na-
ture” is also the “way of heaven” or “the way of the eternal moral order” 
(Tianchen, 2003; Miller, 2010). This does seem to support my suggestion of a 
double-sided concept of nature, where one part of the concept is primarily re-
lated to heaven—this is the perfectionist element, where we should search for the 




DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.82009 106 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
has a much stronger relation to earth and includes a variety of “ways off nature”. 
This way, humans can be part of nature (as a whole) at the same time as they 
strive to find the more heavenly “way of nature”. 
3. Circularity, Balance and Interconnectedness 
The idea of a triangular unity of earth, nature/heaven and humanity can be and 
has been interpreted in a number of ways (Lai, 2003), but in the recent debate it 
has primarily been seen as envisaging a place for humans within nature charac-
terized by respectful interaction and reciprocity between humans and (the rest 
of) nature, and where humans find a more humble place in order not to block or 
ruin the grand circles of life (Tu, 2001; Shi, 2002; Kemmerer, 2009). This is based 
on a general assumption that the system as a whole, at its best, works as a ba-
lanced organism. Good is what further the flourishing of the system as a whole; 
evil is when the circulation of matter and cosmic energy (qi or ch’i) is blocked 
with negative effects somewhere in the system (Munro, 1980). 
These ideas obviously work smoothly with modern efforts to establish, e.g., a 
steady state economy (Daly, 1977) or a circular production system devoid of 
waste (McDonough & Braungart, 2002; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013). It is 
also fully compatible with ecological economists’ insistence that the human 
economy is only part of a larger ecological system, and that economic expansion 
threatens balances crucial for ecological functions (Daly, 1977).  
Human beings obtain materials and energy from a circular system, and they 
must return them to this system and do their best to reduce waste in order to 
avoid blockages and destruction. “Round and round goes the divine order of 
things”, as the ancient Chinese put it. For Neo-Confucians frugality is a basic 
moral virtue; humans will end up suffering if they cannot control their aspira-
tions. This, again, can be reinterpreted in a modern setting as a warning against 
over-consumption and one-sided commitments to economic growth leading to 
collapses in ecological systems (e.g., Jenkins, 2002).  
The traditional circular image can, according to the Neo-Confucians, be con-
trasted with China’s modernizers’ view of “development” and “progress” as re-
volutionary concepts breaking with the continuous cyclical alignment of hu-
manity, earth and heaven (or nature). The acknowledgment of perpetual circu-
larity is replaced by an ambition of persistent alterations towards some positive 
future goal. This is the legacy from Western Enlightenment, no matter whether 
the inheritors are Marxists or Liberalist. 
Several writers also emphasize that Neo-Confucian ecological ethics neither 
give humans any right to dominate the rest of nature, nor sacrifices human de-
velopment in order to preserve pristine nature (e.g., Tianchen, 2003). Neo- 
Confucians typically defend a unity of humankind and (the rest of) nature based 
on mutual respect or harmony between the two. On the one hand, humans are 
allowed to flourish without being ashamed of degrading nature simply by being 
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tended to the natural environment with the goal of establishing an “ecological 
harmony”, where partial interests and overall interests, immediate interests and 
long-term interests are somehow aligned.  
Even if interpretive caution is needed, there seems to be no doubt that tradi-
tional Chinese philosophy emphasizes a need for harmonious integration not 
only within the human world, but also in the relationship between humans and 
nature as a whole. Li even claims, on behalf of Neo-Confucianism, that “ecosys-
tems are in urgent need of ethical consideration”. In order to “save the environ-
ment” we must understand “our place within it, and our responsibilities toward 
it” (Tianchen, 2003).  
Modern interpreters of Daoism similarly underline its demand of restraint 
and frugality and search for accordance with nature through the practice of 
wu-wei. This eventually leads up to some kind of Grand Unity, where everything 
becomes a seamlessly integrated part of the same harmonious organic whole. 
Apart from being co-partners of the same cosmic unity, humans are also similar 
to other organisms in many other respects. We can see ourselves in them and 
recognize them as other temporary manifestations of the same circular trans-
formation process that we temporarily take part in, too. We should therefore 
treat them in a considerate manner, if not as brothers and sisters then at least as 
companions. Daoist precepts recommend coexistence with other living beings 
without hurting them, disturbing their homes, or eating their bodies (Tianchen, 
2003; Miller, 2010; Kemmerer, 2009). 
4. Self-Cultivation and Impartiality 
A basic tenet that ties the ideal of harmony and balance to individual actions is 
the request for self-cultivation (dao in the Confucian tradition). Self-cultivation 
is a process that consists of an extension of considerations proceeding in con-
centric circles from oneself at the center to family, community, nation, and ul-
timately to all humanity. Each shift leads into a new stage in a continuous 
process, where the individual first transcends egoism, then parochialism, and fi-
nally chauvinist nationalism. A sense of connectedness and responsibility is ex-
tended to other communities, others regions and nations, and eventually to the 
globe or cosmos in total. The Confucian idea of self-cultivation has often been 
confined to human society, but Neo-Confucians’ inclusion of Daoist traits makes 
it possible to see environmental problems as interruptions of a larger cosmic or-
der (Tucker, 1991, 1993; Tu, 2001; Lai, 2003; Tianchen, 2003).  
Core features of Confucian ethics that are important in the process of self- 
cultivation are benevolence (ren) (Tianchen, 2003), and “selflessness” or impar-
tiality (Fang, 2012). There is a cognitive component involved in impartiality un-
derstood as selflessness—one must find the decision that is advantageous from 
the larger circles point of view—but the Neo-Confucian concept also contains an 
emotional dimension: empathy with and compassion for all things, especially 
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predisposition to feel affection for others and to bond with them, to learn to 
empathize with fellow creatures and learn the right place for each thing (Munro 
1980).  
This idea has a modern parallel in the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss’ 
so-called Ecosophy T, according to which each living being have an equal right to 
live and unfold, and individuals undertake a self-realisation (or self-abnegation) 
processes, where their exclusive selfishness graduately disappear, until finally it 
is possible for them to say: “We seek what is best for ourselves, but through the 
extension of the self, our ‘own’ best is also that of all others” (Næss, 1989). 
People should learn the necessity to “touch the Earth lightly” through expe-
riences with other living creatures, and develop an egalitarian attitude towards 
these through an “acknowledgment of the cycles of life and their interconnection 
in nature”. 
If people act selfishly, they separate themselves not only from their fellow citi-
zens, but also from the interests of the larger community they are part of. Selfish 
people tend to be ignorant of the fact that they take part in a more comprehen-
sive entity, and lack conscious affection for other parts of the “one body”. This is 
intrinsically connected to another tenet, which is basic in Confucianism, but ab-
sent by Næss: knowledge of and obedience to social rules are an important part 
of the ideal life. Fulfillment of one’s social role within a network of relations, of 
which the individual is an organic part, takes precedence over personal needs 
during the self-cultivation process. Individual quests for self-satisfaction in a 
narrow sense are therefore likely to be criticized for immature selfishness. The 
good of the organic whole should never be subordinated to interests of lesser 
units within it.  
In order to avoid criticism individuals must submit to the rules issued within 
the largest relevant unit. The supreme authority must be expected to act on be-
half of the largest public interest. This is a central thread that can be found run-
ning through both traditional and Maoist accounts: individuals and small groups 
are conceived in relation to some larger unit of which they are integral parts. 
Through the process of self-cultivation people realize that their most fundamental 
interests are those of the unit they are part of. One can compare this to an organ 
or a cell realizing that the health of the whole body is their most basic interest, 
not only because the body is a precondition for their own wellbeing, but in an 
even more fundamental sense: the body is what they live for, and they them-
selves may turn out to be dispensable. 
There is an obvious danger of authorities making claims on true or basic in-
terests of individuals, particularly if they themselves experience them as neither 
true nor basic. This problem is comparable to a well-known issue in the French 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s idea of a social contract, where “each 
member is an indivisible part of the whole”, and the citizen therefore “puts his 
person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general 
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must be “forced to be free”.  
The metaphysics of cosmic unity never seems to have played a part in Mao-
ism, but like Rousseau, it tended to consider individuals’ basic interests as coex-
tensive with duties towards the larger whole. People should accept the idea that 
the interests of the whole are their own most basic needs and regard them as at-
tainable only through obedience to the prescripts from the centre. The Party es-
tablished itself as the general will’s representative, capable of identifying the in-
terests of the whole, wherefore their recommendations became identical with the 
basic interest of all citizens. Individuals are thus helped in realizing their basic 
interest in a “higher kind of freedom”. This permits rulers to force citizens, 
whose actions do not meet official approval, on the grounds that they do not 
understand their “true interests” (Munro, 1980). 
In order to avoid these potentially totalitarian traits it is necessary to reinterp-
ret the process of self-cultivation towards impartiality in other terms than sel-
flessness. Brian Barry has suggested that we distinguish between two kinds of 
impartiality (Barry, 1995). First order impartiality implies that everybody is 
treated equally independent of his or her relation to an individual. If individuals 
give presents to their children, they must do likewise to all children, etc. This 
kind of impartiality easily ends in the kind of selflessness that lies open for tota-
litarian attacks.  
With second order impartiality, on the other hand, individuals are allowed to 
have more comprehensive duties towards the individuals with whom they have 
the closest relations, first of all themselves, then their family, then their local 
community, and their nation, but these duties never become so pervasive that 
they prevent other people from acting in a similar way. The existence of other 
individuals or parties within each larger community set the limits on people’s 
commitments towards themselves, their relatives, and their community, but 
without erasing the specific interests and commitments on each level. Love and 
friendship towards particular persons are allowed, even recommended, whereas 
fraud, nepotism, chauvinism, etc. are ruled out. 
Peter Wenz has similarly suggested a Concentric Circle Theory (Wenz, 1988), 
according to which we all have the most comprehensive duties and commit-
ments towards people in our innermost circle, i.e. ourselves, our families and 
close friends, and where the comprehensiveness diminishes as we move from the 
closest to larger circles ending with the largest circles that we can imagine, in-
cluding, first, humankind, and secondly, all living creatures.  
The fact that duties and commitments become still less comprehensive does 
not mean that they become less and less important. On the contrary, the duties 
towards all members of the largest circle are in some sense supreme, because 
they set the limits for duties in the next, smaller circle, etc. This way no one is 
left out, and no one needs to act out of total selflessness, because everybody are 
allowed to have special commitments to themselves and to members of their 
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else. 
5. The Marxist Legacy 
The fact that a Marxist-Leninist worldview has been capable of dominating Chi-
nese thoughts for more than half a century, and that recently ideals of market 
based development has taken over very quickly, is a strong indicator that neither 
cultures nor philosophies are tightly sealed unchanging systems incapable of 
change. It indicates a cultural inhomogeneity that makes it possible for new in-
fluences to get a foothold. Foreign ideas are never doomed to fail, just because 
they are foreign. 
Is Marxism compatible with eco-civilization, sustainability and degrowth? If 
we look at the ideas of growth and productivism dominating recent development 
in China, it is obvious that Marxist-Leninist ideology may have been quite in-
fluential in setting the course. One of its most basic thoughts is the idea of 
progress: the human species develops through a number of stages defined by the 
relations of production and with technological development as main driver. 
Social justice and belief in continuously improved conditions for future gen-
erations are crucial elements, too, often at the expense of environmental consid-
erations. Non-human nature has been of little interest in itself in the mainstream 
Marxist tradition, which in this sense belongs to the Western biblical tradition, 
where the wilderness outside the Garden of Eden must be conquered, subdued, 
and transformed into means of fulfilling still more refined human ends. Progress 
is an almost inevitable feature. Resource limits occur, of course, and sets 
progress on halt for a while, but sooner or later they will be overcome through 
technological innovation. Labour and technological ingenuity remain the main 
causes of value creation, not only in capitalist societies. 
Karl Marx himself did now and again utter worries about his contemporary 
industry’s devastating influence on its surroundings, particularly a loss of soil 
fertility that might threaten the ‘‘conditions of life required by the chain of suc-
cessive generations’’ (Marx, 1894/1993). His partner Friedrich Engels underlined 
this even stronger, first of all in his description of the conditions of the working 
class in the large towns of England in 1844 (Engels, 1844/2009). But both quickly 
related environmental destruction to the uncontrolled influence of blind market 
forces in capitalist society and anticipated a more consciously planned develop-
ment in future post-capitalist society.  
According to the Marxist view of history, humans will finally release them-
selves from the blind powers—whether those of nature or those of capitalist 
market forces—that dominates the ‘‘realm of necessity”, and jump into the ulti-
mate ‘‘realm of freedom”. Here they become true masters of nature, and will no 
longer be exposed to wasteful, ugly, and unhealthy conditions. A new set of col-
lectivist relations of production is bound to release brand new forces of produc-
tion that will make all previous barriers of necessity wither away. 
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freedom’’, i.e., socialism or communism, to encompass continuous material 
growth, or rather, like John Stuart Mill, mainly thought of it in terms qualitative 
development (Mill, 1848/1965), but degrowth was certainly never an issue in 
traditional Marxism-Leninism. Nor was population control a concern in this 
tradition after Marx’ harsh critique of Thomas Malthus. More people meant 
more freedom fighters in the struggle to humanize nature.  
Mao Zedong was fully in line with this tradition of fighting for freedom 
against necessity, when he launched his famous “war against nature (tian)” (cf. 
Shapiro, 2000)—a war which was also conceived as the human will’s war against 
fate, destiny and the preexisting order (other meanings of tian), as well as against 
all cosmic and social powers opposing the united will of the masses struggling 
for freedom and progress (Miller, 2010).  
In some sense Mao even seems to have gone one step further and declared war 
against the very laws of nature—and against the advice of intellectuals and scien-
tists who warned against the dangers of doing this. The united will power and 
energy of the masses were expected to work as substitute for scientific know-
ledge in the war on nature, a strategy with truly fatal consequences (Shapiro, 
2000), even though one should be careful not to overlook differences over time 
and across the country (Ho, 2003). 
It would be quite unfair to say that Marxism is incompatible with ideas of 
ecological civilizations, sustainability, and even degrowth. A significant number 
of modern scholars, who see themselves as participators in the greening of mod-
ern society, still work within a (revised) Marxist framework. They even tend to 
see the current development in China as a confirmation of the assumption that 
capitalist market relations constitute the essential part of the “realm of necessi-
ty”, which is the main cause of environmental degradation, and which forecloses 
conscious planning in the “realm of freedom”. This brings me to my final ques-
tion, to what extent traditional and modern Chinese ideas are compatible with 
the request to develop an ecologically considerate civilization. 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 
We started by asking what we as Europeans can expect from China as a culture 
that in some respect is different from our own, and which kinds of values are 
likely to be guiding Chinese development. It is interesting, in particular, whether 
concepts like “sustainability”, “environmental carefulness”, and “common con-
cerns of humankind” easily can become topics on the Chinese agenda, or rather 
are likely to be expelled due to some basic tenets in traditional (or modern) 
Chinese worldviews. We have further asked, whether some of the basic concepts 
that are prevalent in the Chinese tradition even may be seen as fruitful additions 
in modern debates about the establishment of cooperative ecological civiliza-
tions? 
Even though one ought to be cautious about over-interpretations, the very fact 
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ern conceptions of sustainability, zero- and degrowth underpins these writers 
own thesis that nothing in the surviving elements of the traditional worldviews 
obstructs the introduction of these modern conceptions in a Chinese context. It 
is obvious, of course, that the modern interpreters may have searched for and 
highlighted exactly those bit and pieces, which support their own agenda, and 
that other traditional ideas pointing in other directions have been downplayed. 
Still, there does seem to be enough evidence to support the view that values and 
concepts, which resemble modern ideas of sustainability and ecological aware-
ness, have had a prominent position in the written Chinese tradition. 
It would be fair to add, too, that the long Chinese tradition of reflections on 
empathy with and compassion for both fellow humans and individuals from 
other species as well as the equally long tradition of seeing units as wholes within 
larger wholes add new tenets to other cultures conceptions of ecological civiliza-
tion. This is the case, in particular, with the idea of the individual’s task to seek 
self-realisation through developing one’s predisposition to feel affection for oth-
ers and to bond with them, to learn to empathize with fellow creatures and learn 
to find and develop a reasonable and harmoniously conceived place for oneself 
within a hierarchy of still more comprehensive wholes. 
Since 1949, when a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist worldview became dominant in 
China, nature (tian) has mainly been regarded as external and subordinate to 
human conquest through the performance of will in combination with science 
and technology (Shapiro, 2000; Ho, 2001). In the Maoist fabric there has been a 
clear thread of the kind of Stalinism, which underlined the need to subjugate 
natural features together with all other obstacles to the victory of communism, 
and even accepted the sacrifice of whole generations on the altar of some quasi- 
religious future ideals (Deutscher, 1966). On the other hand, it would be wrong 
to say that the Marxist legacy as a whole inevitable lead to neglect of environ-
mental issues and human rights concerns.  
As indicated by the large number of convinced and dedicated eco-socialists 
around the globe, the Marxist scepticism towards capitalist organisation forms 
and market based solutions need not be combined with an ideology of control 
and conquest of the natural environment. There are ideological components 
enough in the writings of Marx, Engels and their followers to support an eco- 
friendly civilizational course. So even though the Marxist legacy in modern Chi-
nese ideology for a long time has been interpreted in a way that underlines and 
encourages humans’ conquest and transformation of their natural surroundings, 
this legacy need not be an obstacle either.  
What is actually more worrying is the fact that even at the heyday of Confu-
cianism, Daoism, and Buddhism massive environmental degradation was al-
ready taking place, as documented, for instance, by the historian Mark Elvin 
(Elvin, 2004). This indicates that the determining factor does not need to be one 
or the other (elitist) philosophical system, but may be what Elvin has called 
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(ibid.). Likewise, the origin of China’s current environmental problems cannot 
be explained fully by the modernizers’ rejection of traditional Chinese culture 
and the adoption of Western values. Mao’s appeals about struggling with nature 
seem to have deep roots within Chinese culture and history itself (Miller, 2010).  
It is not truly convincing to see all movements in history as epiphenomena of 
an essential blind and continuous fight for power and profit. Although this kind 
of struggle may be an ever-present part of life, it has certainly been organized in 
a number of different ways, including a number of civilized ones, and has lead to 
substantially different results. Nor is it convincing to think that the presence or 
absence of market forces in itself is sufficient to explain consumption patterns. 
Market forces are always regulated, promoted or blocked by political authorities, 
and this is always done in a specific way with a particular purpose. What is 
more: people are seldom just ignorant victims of such apparently uncontrollable 
forces, but are often quite satisfied with the impacts of their implementation.  
Still, one may have doubts about how much the traditional ideas discussed in 
this paper are capable of influencing day-to-day policies, dominated not only by 
profit and power but also, in the current situation, by strong culturally founded 
consumerist trends, supported by political authorities (Harris, 2004). Many poli-
ticians and researchers all over the world seem to have forsaken any faith in fra-
gile hopes for a paradigmatic philosophical change that is strong enough oppose 
consumerism and lead to a more harmonic cooperation with the rest of nature. 
Instead, they have put their ambitions in the so-called ecological modernization 
paradigm, which emerged in the wake of the Brundtland report with an optimis-
tic ambition of creating a kind of economic growth that decouple the creation of 
wealth from environment damages and resource consumption, partly by way of 
smart state regulations, partly through voluntary contributions from committed 
companies and citizens.  
However, even the downplayed prosaic ambition lurking behind the ecologi-
cal modernization paradigm remains a hope for the development of a cleaner 
and less damaging interrelationship between humans and the rest of nature. In 
this sense there is continuity between this calm ambition and the more high- 
flying ideals of ecological harmony and self-cultivation. Moreover, the ecological 
modernization ideal relies on the assumption that a decoupling of material and 
economic growth is a possibility. This may certainly work for some time, but 
nobody can say for how long. If significant economic growth continues for dec-
ades, it is hard to believe that decoupling and dematerialisation can continue to 
absorb the potential damages (Xue et al., 2011). Eventually it must come to an end, 
either because the impacts become overwhelming or because economic growth 
loses its attraction, and between now and then deliberations about which ideas to 
employ when dealing with this new situation may not be the worst way to spend 
one’s time. 
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